Lexical representation so far has not been extensively investigated in regard to language acquisition.
INTRODUCTION
Examination of the language acquisition task sheds light on the nature of the lexicon, illuminating issues which have been ignored by existing linguistic systems [Wilks75, Kay79, Bresnan82b, Gazdar85] . Current systems restrict their account to analysis and generation of text, by making the assumption that a fixed, complete lexicon exists at the outset. This assumption proves unrealistic for two reasons: First, due to the huge size of the lexicon (especially when including idioms and phrases) it is difficult to manually encode the entire lexicon. This problem is further aggravated as people contents-the way individual entries are encoded, and (b) its structure-the way entries are organized.
The need to detect discrepancies affects the contents of the lexicon. Both semantic and syntactic discrepancies must be detected, and correction strategies must be associated with various types of errors. Thus, lexical entries should not be underspecified, lest they will allow discrepancies to slip by unnoticed.
The need to generalize affects the structure of the lexicon. In order to make an initial hypothesis about a new element, it is important to glean from the text as much information as possible. This requirement is problematic: the text cannot be analyzed since an element is unknown; but on the other hand, for the element to be acquired, the text must be analyzed. The solution for this bootstrapping problem is to employ a lexical hierarchy by generality. When a specific pattern does not exist for a precise matching against the new element, one can apply a more general pattern, which albeit being less informative, does match the new element.
Thus, we propose employing a Dynamic Hierarchical Phrasal Lexicon (DHPL) which has three features: (a) lexical entries are given as entire phrases and not as single words, (b) phrases are organized in a hierarchy by generality, and (c) there is not separate grammar; grammar is encoded in general lexical phrases. The program RINA [Zernik86b, Zernik87a] employs DHPL in modeling language acquisition. In particular, the program models second language acquisition of English phrases and idioms. The linguistic concepts being acquired are complex enough, so that neither a human learner, nor a computer program can acquire their complete behavior through a single example. Thus the initial hypothesis might be incorrect. Capturing incorrect hypotheses generated by humans, and simulating them by the computer program is essential for practical and theoretical reasons. First, the human user of the program will relate to the human-like errors generated by the program. Consequently he may present the program with constructive counterexamples. Second, human errors, such as errors of overgeneralization, reveal otherwise inaccessible cognitive processes and internal structures. Thus, errors made by human learners play a central role in constructing a cognitive model of acquisition. Subsequently, observed human behavior is analyzed in terms of the computer program RINA.
THE LINGUISTIC BEHAVIOR
RINA receives examples from a user who teaches her new phrases. When RINA encounters a new phrase, she creates a hypothesis about its behavior, and accordingly she generates an example to demonstrate her state of knowledge. Communication between the program and the user is only through a sequence of examplesthere is no way to discuss syntax and semantics explicitly.
(1) LEARNING NEW PHRASES In the following dialog, RINA encounters an unknown phrase, throw the book at somebody.
User: AI Capone went on trial.
The judge threw the book at him. RINA: He threw a book at him? User: No. The judge threw the book at him. RINA: He punished him severely?
RINA is familiar with the single words throw and book. However, the entire figurative phrase is not in her lexicon. RINA first attempts a literal interpretation using a phrase existing in the lexicon (throw an object). When this interpretation fails she realizes the existence of an unknown, and tries to form the meaning of the new phrase by using (a) the context, and (b) the single words in the phrase. 
User: RINA:
Jenny goggled John to come over. Jenny told John that he must/can/will come to her.
RINA manages to extract useful information from the sentence in spite of the missing element. In particular, RINA's hypothesis includes three points:
(a) Jenny's unknown act is a kind ofmtrans* (an act of communication). (b) The actor of the communicated event (coming over) is John. (c) The communicated event is a conditional plan for the future (in contrast, for example, to the case:
Jenny goggled John that he came over).
Normally, properties of an embedded phrase (e.g., to come over) are determined by the definition of the embedding verb. RINA manages to make an initial hypothesis even though the embedding verb (goggle) is unknown, by using generalized knowledge of phrase interaction. (The structure of a sentence: Personl goggled Person2 to do Act3 implies mtrans such as ask, tell and instruct, in contrast to Personl goggled to do Act2 which implies an mbuild, such as decide). The hypothesis must be abstract, since RINA cannot determine at this point whether this mtrans act comes in the sense of allow (can come over), or instruct (must come over). Yet, even this hypothesis may turn out to be incorrect. For example, goggle could mean seduce, or influence in some other way. In either, it is important to come up with a hypothesis which provides a basis for further modification.
*Conceptual classes such as mtrans, mbuild, select-plan, are based on semantic representation. Several of these elements are taken from Schank's [Schank77] system of primitive acts, goals and plans. Mtrans for example represents the transfer of mental information, and mbuild represents the construction of new information in memory.
The particular scheme chosen is not so important as the fact that syntactic classes (such as verbs) are organized phrasally in terms of conceptual categories.
(3) RESOLVING AN AMBIGUITY AS with human listeners, computer parsers must also be able to interpret text successfully only when supplied the appropriate context [Zernik86a] . Consider the following sentence:
User: She took it up with her dad. RINA: ?
Imagine a person hearing a fragment of a conversation between two unknown people, or alternatively, a computer program being given this sentence in isolation. Clearly, in the absence of a context, this sentence does not make complete sense. The pronouns, she and it cannot be resolved in absence of referents which have been introduced in the discourse. In addition, the same phrase will mean different things in different contexts. Consider these two examples.
plan (John decided to go home). This behavior does not capture verbs such as suggest, require or ten (John told to go sounds incorrect). The speaker faced a generation task in presence of incomplete lexical knowledge about suggest and require, and he resorted to using generalized knowledge. Using such knowledge, an idea could be communicated, albeit grammatically incorrectly. Therefore, the lexicon must maintain phrases at various level of generality, to cope with different degrees of partial knowledge.
(2) USING LINGUISTIC CLUES Meaning representation is extracted from the context. For example, given the text below, AI Capone went on trial. The judge threw the book at him.
User: Jenny wanted to buy a new car.
She took it up with her dad. RINA: She discussed the issue with her dad. User: Jenny started jogging.
She took it up with her dad. RINA: She started an activity with him.
Since the same sentence can be interpreted in two ways in two different contexts, a question is raised regarding disambiguation. What is the impact of the context on phrase selection?
ISSUES IN LANGUAGE ACQUISITION
Three lexical representation issues must be addressed in modeling language acquisition.
(1) USING GENERALIZATIONS As shown in the sentence below, Jenny goggled John to come over. the system must cope with unknown elements. Parts of the text must be examined to some extent, in spite of the presence of the unknown. Ideally, each element in the text is matched by a lexical phrase. Since no such phrase exists for a precise matching of the unknown element, a generalized phrase must be used to recover at least partial information. However, by the nature of generalization, the more generalized the matching phrase, the less informative it is.
Typical errors of overgeneralization were generated in a version of this paper by the first author, who is a second language speaker:
• The third phrase requires to generalize the initial notion. (Section 6) • Wilensky suggested to represent knowledge as a database of rules. (Section 3.2)
In both cases, the learner applied the wrong generalized phrase, which accounts for verbs such as decide and RINA guessed that throw the book at somebody means to punish that person severely. However, the context might consist of many concepts, some appropriate and some inappropriate (e.g.: did the judge acquit AI or did he punish him?). Thus, a basic task is feature extraction. In extracting features, the system must utilize clues provided by single words. For example, what is the significance of the particle at? How does it contribute to the construction of the meaning? An experiment with second language speakers reveals, predictably, that using a different preposition leads to a different learning result. When the given text is:
AI Capone went on trial. The judge threw the book to him.
language learners formed the hypothesis that the judge actually acquited the defendant. Thus, the lexicon must maintain senses for single words such as at and to that could be used as linguistic clues in feature extraction.
(3) USING SEMANTIC CLUES
The system must hypothesize the scope and variability of the new phrases. Which one of the phrases below best captures the syntax of the new phrase: the judge threw the book at him?
He threw something at him. He threw a book at him. He threw the book at him.
Each one of these patterns could be the specification of the new phrase. In determining degree of specificity the system must consult semantic clues extracted during parsing. For example, since no actual book exists in the context, then the reference the book is assumed to be a fixed literal. In contrast, consider the context below:
The judge was holding the third volume of tax law. He threw the book at AI.
In this context, an instance of a book is found in the context (i.e., the third volume), and a different hypothesis is made about the the generality of the new pattern. Thus, semantic discrepancies in parsing must be utilized in determining both scope and generality of syntactic patterns.
ACCOUNTING FOR IDIOMACITY IN THE LEXICON
What are the contents of the lexicon to be acquired? Traditionally, the lexicon has been viewed as a list of words, specifying syntactic and semantic properties for each entry. However, since in our theory, the lexicon provides the sole linguistic database, it must include a variety of linguistic knowledge types, not just properties of single words. Here the lexicon is extended in two ways: towards the specific by bringing in idioms, and towards the general by including grammar.
IDIOMS AS EQUAL CITIZENS
Are idioms, such as throw the book at, a class apart, to be distinguished from "normal" phrases, which abide by grammar rules? The first to proclaim "equal rights" for idioms was Becker [Becker75] , who called for a systematic treatment for the variety of phrases in the language. Consider these phrases:
We will be looking forward to seeing you guys. He is cheap. He will not pay $5 let alone $8. So much for superficial solutions. Productive as well as non-productive phrases should reside in the lexicon.
These phrases defy traditional text-book grammar analysis, however, they possess their own grammar. For example, it sounds odd to say lie is cheap; He will not pay $8 let alone $5 [Fillmore87] . (Is the behavior of as well as analogous to the behavior of let alone?) Such linguistic phenomena cannot be ignored merely by tagging it as idiomatic, since idioms turn out to be ubiquitous in people's speech. Hardly can a sentence be found which behaves according to textbook grammar. There is a need therefore for a systematic treatment of idiosyncracy [Fillmore87] . Furthermore, linguistic knowledge cannot be strictly divided into grammar rules and lexical items. Rather, there is an entire range of items: some very specific, in the sense that they pertain to a small number of instances, and some very general, pertaining to a large number of instances. The former have been called "lexical items", and the latter "grammar rules". However, it is not possible to define a clear borderline between such two distinct groups, as elements could be found at all levels of generality, not just at the two ends of the spectrum. On one end, the phrase it is raining cats and dogs is very idiomatic. On other end, the phrase in John took the spoon from Uary is an instance of a general verb, to take, which may appear in many other ways. However, consider the phrase John took the issue up with his dad. Is this an idiom, or is it just an instance of the general verb to To a certain extent, all the phrases above derive their meanings from the meaning of the verb to throw. However, the issue here is whether a single generic lexical entry for throw can suffice to produce the meanings of all those sentences. In example (6) (he threw a stone), the phrase for throw is used in its generic form and meaning: to throw a physical object means to propel that object through the air. Sentence (9) (he threw away a banana peel) too can be interpreted using the generic phrase. In sentence (8) (he threw out the garbage), on the other hand, the derivation of the meaning using the generic phrase is less direct, as it requires analysis at the level of plans and goals. Throwing an object causes the object to become inaccessible. Thus throwing out the garbage does not necessarily mean throwing it in the air as much as getting rid of it. The meanings of the other sentences are even more detached from the generic meaning. The meaning of throw the book (11) at is not a mere composition of the meanings of the single words, but requires extraneous knowledge from the trial situations. Neither a person, nor a computer program can produce the meaning of the phrase if the context is not given. Sentence (4) (he threw his weight around) introduces a metaphor [LakoffS0] in which a person's authority is compared to a weight, being used in a careless way. Sentence (2) (he threw a party) as well as sentence (5) (he threw a temper tantrum), use a different meaning of throw (to throw an event) which can hardly be related to its original meaning. Finally, sentence (12) (he threw it) represents a novel, yet still understandable, use of the word throw Non-productive phrases are those in which the meaning of the entire phrase cannot be produced from the meanings of its constituents. Such phrases should be maintained in the lexicon as distinct entries. In fact, even productive phrases, such as to throw out the garbage, should be maintained as distinct entries. Even if the meaning can be produced each time from the single words, an objective of an efficient system is to compile knowledge whenever possible, and to minimize unnecessary derivations. Thus, phrases in the lexicon can be viewed as linguistic episodes indexed and compiled for further use. Such knowledge is redundant in regard to language parsing (the meaning could be derived from the constituents again and again). However, this is not the case in language generation, where unless the phrase is stored, it is unlikely to be generated again by the system. Thus, both productive and non-productive phrases must be stored in the lexicon. share the implication that the sensory act was directed at the object. Which ones of these phrases should be maintained in the lexicon? Fixed, idiosyncratic phrases such as at large, at once, and at all must be maintained in the lexicon. Otherwise they cannot be predicted by the system. However, the dilemma arises regarding variable phrases, such as in (22), (26) and (27) . The question is whether to maintain all instances of a certain variable phrase or to maintain a single generalized entry which encompasses them all. We argue that both must be maintained. Specific phrases must be maintained as compiled, easy to access knowledge, while general phrases, which can derive many specific phrases, must be maintained too so that the system has a predictive power. Using such generalized phrases, the system can handle instances which have not been previously encountered.
In fact, specific "canned" phrases could not account for the following generation task, concerning the selection of appropriate prepositions in the following sentences:
(28) There is one teacher {in on at} our school, which I really like. (29) I stayed late {in on at} school.
Notice that since both sentences involve the word school, it could not be used as a discriminator. Unless the lexicon maintains general predicates for the use of in, at, and on, the generator cannot select the appropriate preposition in each case. Clearly, it is difficult to capture the intuition of a native speaker in forming the general senses of these prepositions. An approximation of this intuition can be captured by modeling a secondlanguage speaker who might "incorrectly" generate a sentence such as (23) above: (23) Fred lives at New York.
Although it does not sound right to an English speaker, this sentence reflects the notion of that particular speaker.
2.40VERSPECIFICATION AND UNDERSPECIFICATION
Lexical entries should not be either underspecified or overspecified. Unless the lexical phrases are fully specified, they cannot serve in disambiguation. On the other hand, overspecification should also be avoided. Indeed, in encoding lexicons there is a temptation to overspecify. Consider the following pairs of examples in regard to lexical constraints:
He kicked the bucket. Mary was taken by the car dealer. He put his foot down. She laid down the law. He took on Goliath.
The bucket was kicked.
The car dealer took her. He put down his foot. She laid the law down. He took on him.
There is a tendency to incorporate in the lexicon syntactic restrictions which will prevent the instances on the right. For example, kick the bucket would be marked as active-voice-only. This is in contrast to the phrase bury the hatchet which maintain its figurative flavor also in the passive voice: the hatchet was buried by Israel and Egypt.
We believe that this behavior is not dictated by an arbitrary, ad hoc syntactic restriction, rather it reflects the conceptual representation of the phrase as it has been shaped in the acquisition process [Zernik87b] . The acquisition of the phrase bury the hatchet was based on a metaphor, and generalized from single-word meanings. Bury was generalized into disenable-use, and the referent the hatchet was generalized to a tool, the availability of which is a precondition for an active conflict. Therefore, the reference the hatchet stands for a certain generalized object. On the other hand, kick the bucket was learned as a whole chunk, since the underlying metaphor remained unresolved. Thus, the referent the bucket is maintained as a literal not associated with any concept. Due to this difference, there may arise a discourse function for passivizing bury the hatchet. However, since there is no referent for the bucket, there will never occur the need to passivize that phrase. Therefore, marking the phrase pattern as activevoice-only is redundant (albeit correct).
Another issue is verb-modifier separation, i.e.: David took on Goliath vs. He took him on. How can the lexicon account for this separation phenomenon? A grossly overspecified rule claims that pronouns (and only pronouns) separate such two-word verbs. However, there are counterexamples such as:
He took that ugly giant on.
(where the separation is by a lengthy reference). Therefore the rule must be revised to relate the phenomenon to given and new references. A given, or an already resolved reference, can separate, while a new reference cannot be placed between the verb andits modifier. We believe that this behavior should not be specified by the lexicon, rather the generation decision is according to discourse functions.
Overspecified lexical entries can always be contradicted by instances in context. In order to avoid the such contradictions we take the approach of maintaining syntactic specifications of lexical entries at appropriate levels, and use conceptual representation to account for apparently syntactic restrictions.
LEXICAL REPRESENTATION: PREVIOUS WORK
DHPL is a continuation of efforts in three distinct areas. First, in integrating the underlying situation as part of the lexical entry, we extend previous work on lexical presupposition. Second, we modify Wilensky's method of lexical representation for use in language acquisition. Third, we examine Bresnan's system of linguistic representation, which proves problematic in light of the acquisition task, and compare it to DHPL's representation.
presupposition of the utterance, is described by Keenan (1971) as follows*:
The presuppositions of a sentence are those conditions that the world must meet in order for the sentence to make literal sense. Thus if some such condition is not met, for some sentence S, then either S makes no sense at all or else it is understood in some nonliteral way, for example as a joke or metaphor.
Despite this definition of presupposition as a condition for application of lexical knowledge, presupposition has been studied as a means for generation and propagation of inferences, reversing its role as a condition. In [Gazdar79, Karttunen79, Keenan71] the goal has been to compute the part of the sentence which is already given, by applying "backward" reasoning, i.e.: from the sentence the king of France is bald determine if indeed there is a king in France, or from the sentence it was not John who broke the glass, determine whether somebody indeed broke the glass. Rather than using presuppositions to develop further inferences, we investigate how presuppositions are actually applied according to Keenan's definition above, namely, in determining appropriate utterance interpretations.
Fillmore [Fillmore78] introduced lexical presupposition to describe situations in which lexical items may appear. He described the meanings of judgement words such as accuse, criticize, blame, and praise, by separating the entire meaning into (a) a statement (the illocutionary act), and (b) a presupposition. We illustrate this distinction by comparing the meanings of criticize and accuse in the following sentences: (30) John criticized Mary for adjourning the meeting. (31) John accused Mary of adjourning the meeting. In both sentences, John referred to a hypothetical act, namely adjourning the meeting. In (30), it is presupposed that Mary committed the act (a test for determining presupposition is invariance under negation: John did not criticize Mary of adjourning the meeting still implies that Mary committed the act), while it is stated that the act is judged negatively. In (31), on the other hand, it is stated that Mary committed the act, while it is presupposed that the act is negative.
We believe Fillmore's approach is suitable also for the task of language acquisition, since learning involves factoring out the statement of a phrase from the entire surrounding context. We have further pursued Fillmore's notion in utilizing lexical presupposition in specific tasks such as disambiguation, indexing, and accounting for communicative goals [Gasser86a] .
Presupposition must be distinguished from precondition. Consider the following text.
LEXICAL PRESUPPOSITION
A message might be conveyed by an utterance beyond its straightforward illocution. That message, called the John ran into a pedestrian on a red light.
He managed to explain it away in court. The lexical phrase under consideration is explain away.
The presupposition for the application of the phrase is the entire situation in which the phrase typically appears. A person is attempting to justify a certain planning failure. The precondition for the enablement of the act, on the other hand, is a planning element from the domain itself. One precondition in the story above could be the judge's permission for John to stand up in court and defend his own case. Another trivial example is the sentence below.
selection is by specificity, namely, the most specific phrase is selected. An additional layer was added to this work by Jacobs [Jacobs85] who noticed the need for inheritance and hierarchy in the lexicon. Concepts in memory are organized in a hierarchy of categories, through which more specific concepts can inherit features from more general ones. Concepts in the lexicon, namely lexical items, should be organized through the same general discipline. This approach enjoys three advantages:
John threw a rock at Mary.
There is no presupposition for the generic phrase person throw phys-obj. This phrase may appear in almost any context. However, from a planning point of view, for a person to throw a rock she must first grasp the rock in her hand. In contrast to presupposition, such planning information should not reside in the lexicon. In fact, any information which could be derived by means of general world knowledge does not belong in the lexicon.
Dyer [Dyer83] has described text comprehension as an integrated cognitive process. Parsing, he claimed, cannot be separated from other cognitive tasks such as memory update and retrieval. Accordingly, search demons were introduced in lexical entries to perform memory retrieval. For example, consider the difference between the two sentences. (32) John made up his mind. (33) He decided to go swimming. In parsing sentence (33) the selected plan, namely going swimming, is mentioned explicitly. However, in sentence (32) neither the plan nor the problem to be resolved are mentioned explicitly. Therefore, a search demon associated with the phrase make up one' s mind is dispatched to retrieve from memory the problem under consideration by the actor of the phrase. One of the objectives of DHPL's representation is to eliminate such procedural knowledge. Lexical presupposition serves the task of memory retrieval. The mechanisms we use are unification and variable binding. Wilensky [Wilensky81] promoted the view of language processing as a knowledge-based task. Accordingly, he suggested representing linguistic knowledge as a database of rules given at various levels of generality. The basic representation element is called a phrase, given as a pattern-concept pair. For example, the phrase in the sentence:
LANGUAGE AS A KNOWLEDGE-BASED SYSTEM
• Modularity: Adding a new entry does not require any global modification.
• Declarativeness: The representation is neutral with respect to parsing and generation. The representation does not reflect any programming style (beyond basic slot-filler notation) and it does not reflect the mechanism of any particular parser. • Uniformity: Modifying the level of generality of a phrase does not require a change of the phrase beyond the single feature being updated (generalized or specified). is given as the phrase pattern ?x:person drop out of ?y:school concept goal of person ?x, pursue-education at institute ?y, terminated unsuccessfully Parsing is viewed as a process of rule (phrase) application. When more than one rule is applicable (ambiguity),
The meaning of ask is given as the predicate ask which takes either two or three arguments. There is no general notion which captures the similarities in the behavior of the two specific entries. In the hierarchical approach, on the other hand, the behavior of ask is described in the broader context of the infinitive interaction between phrases. The schematic hierarchy is given in Figure 2 below: The judge threw the book at him.
The underlying knowledge is the the trial script, which captures the basic events taking place in court. In this scheme, there is a single phrase for ask (P2). This phrase draws properties from a more general phrase (P1) which defines the general equi rule in complementtaking English verbs. In this representation, the behavior of ask is inherited from the general phrase P1 and there is no need to duplicate specificcases. LFG current theory does not facilitate such hierarchies. In absence of hierarchy and inheritance, there is a need for duplication of the learning effort which can lead to serious flaws in modeling human behavior. For example, the word promise presents an exception to the general equi rule. Consider John promised Mary to go, in contrast to John asked Mary %o go. The latter implies that John is the actor of the future act of going (John promised that he will go, but John asked that Mary go). In learning this behavior of promise, children make an error by hypothesizing the default equi rule, thus committing an error of overgeneralization (a child might say: Dad promised Tommy to drive the big car alone meaning "Tommy will drive the car"). In LFG it is impossible to model this behavior since generalizations do not exist. Indeed, Pinker [Pinker84] accounted for this error, but the equi rule he resorted to is not part of the LFG system itself. Moreover, through LFG it is impossible to recover from overgeneralization. Normally people recover from overgeneralizations by being given a counterexample (No. Dad promised Tommy to take him to Disneyland). However, since neither Bresnan nor Pinker attempt to represent meanings of words such as take and drive --the meanings are actually represented as the symbols "take" and "drive" -it is impossible to make the necessary semantic inferences for error recovery. Thus, without the ability to generalize and without an appropriate representation of concepts, LFG as currently defined, cannot account for these behaviors in learning.
This script, as shown in Figure 3 , consists of a sequence of four events, in which the characters are the judge, the prosecutor, and a defendant. In addition, there is knowledge of the character's goals. The prosecutor is interested in thwarting a preservation goal -p-freedom, p-property of the defendant. The defendant attempts to block this goal thwart. Both parties advance their cases by trying to convince the judge. By this representation the meaning of the phrase to throw the book at somebody means to punish him severely, based on events (a) and (1) in the script.
Another situation, involving the same script, is presented in the following text.
John ran over a pedestrian. He failed to explain it away in court, and he went to jail In this case the phrase explain away pertains to the underlying goal-plan situation, given in Figure 4 
REPRESENTING THE CONTEXT
The semantics of entries in the lexicon draw from the various contexts in which they have been applied. Here we represent contexts using scripts, plans, goals, and relationships [Schank77, Dyer83, Dyer86b] . Consider the context in reading the text:
ing safely). John's preservation goal of freedom is threatened. A plan for preserving this goal is convincing the judge as to why John himself was not at fault. This second plan is executed and it fails also. Thus, his p-goal fails.
Notice that the same goal-plan schema exists also in the case of the next story:
Joe forgot to put away the dirty dishes.
When his wife came home, he argued it away by telling her he had been working.
BASIC PHRASE STRUCTURE
Consider the marked clause in the following text.
For years they tried to prosecute A1 Capone. Finally, a judge threw the book at him for income-tax evasion.
The phrase argue away also involves a prior plan failure, a thwarted p-goal (p-social-relation) and a recovery plan of convincing the other party. This underlying schema is a presupposition. It holds whether Joe fails to argue it away or whether he manages to argue it away. Since the same plan-goal schema underlies both phrases (up to the specific plan: argue vs. explain), they both can be viewed as instances of a more general phrase. Many other phrases draw their meanings in terms of such general plan-goal structures. Consider the phrases in the next sentences:
This machine was idling away for hours. They stayed at home, and argued away for hours. The class was boring. John sat near the window dreaming away.
In all these sentences there is a similar underlying situation, shown in Figure 5 below. In this schema a resource competition (the resource is time) exists for an agent between two competing tasks, and that agent subordinates the important goal. The fact that phrase representation can be elevated to a level of general plans and goals is very significant. It implies that a relatively small number of structures can represent phrases whose instances can be used across many domains.
This clause is derived from a lexical phrase which is given as the following simplified template: phrase pattern: presupposition: concept:
Personl throw the book at Person2. Personl is an authority for Person2. Personl punishes person2 severely.
This lexical phrase is a triple associating a linguistic pattern with its semantic concept and presupposition. The pattern specifies the syntactic appearance in text. The presupposition specifies the surrounding context, while the concept specifies the meaning added by the phrase itself. Phrase presupposition, distinguished from phrase concept, is introduced in DHPL's representation since it solves three problems: (a) in disambiguation it provides a discrimination condition for phrase selection, (b) in acquisition it allows the incorporation Of the context of the example as part of the phrase, and (c) in generation it provides an indexing scheme for phrase discrimination and triggering.
The role of the three slots in a phrase template may be better understood by the way they are applied in parsing the text above. The clause is parsed in four steps:
(1) The pattern is matched successfully against the text. Consequently, Personl and Person2 are bound to the judge and to AI Capone respectively (as the person class restrictions imposed by the pattern are satisfied). (2) The presupposition associated with the pattern is validated using the concepts in the context. Using knowledge of human relationships, it is inferred that the judge presents an authority to Capone. (3) Since both (1) and (2) are successful, then the pattern itself is instantiated, adding to the context: The judge punished At Capone severly. (4) Steps (1)-(3) are repeated for each relevant lexical entry. If more than one entry is instantiated, then the concept with the best match is selected.
ORGANIZING THE LEXICON
Retrieval and update are the operations required of memory [Kolodner84] , and of the lexicon in particular. The objective in DHPL is to retrieve lexical entries at various levels of generality. The structure of the lexicon is specified by (a) the structure of a single lexical element, and (b) the global structure in which elements are organized.
(
1) ACTUAL SLOT-FILLER NOTATION
The actual representation of the phrase is implemented using GATE's [Mueller87] slot-filler language, as shown below. In particular notice in that notation that the representation of a phrase, which is a linguistic object, is not different than the representation of other objects in the database. 
Figure 6: The Phrase Notation
Notice that the phrase consists of three main parts: pattern, concept and presupposition (the comment is for reference only).
(2) CASE-FRAME REPRESENTATION This full notation has three features:
(1) The pattern is constructed of four case frames [Carbonel184] .
(2) Case frames are named. For example, object2 is the name of the case frame given as:
This case is referred to as the lexical subject to be distinguished from the surface subject (the element actually preceding the verb in the text). (3) Case frames are unordered, namely no order is imposed among the case frames. In no place in the case frame is it mentioned, for example, that the lexical subject should precede the verb or follow it (or not appear at all). Case ordering, thus, is inherited from general linguistic patterns, as shown later in this paper. (4) Case frames contain both semantic and syntactic properties. For example, objectl defines the named constituents the and book, while object2 defines the class person.
Since not all properties are given explicitly within the pattern itself, there is a need for an inheritance scheme.
Properties such as case order (e.g. active and passive voice), and word-order of the syntactic constituents within cases (e.g. the determiner the precedes the root book) are inherited from general linguistic patterns.
THE GLOBAL STRUCTURE
While varying in generality, lexical entries are represented uniformly throughout. The lexicon can be viewed as a collection of triples (Pattern-Concept-Presupposition), as shown in Figure 7 , which are retrieved for parsing and for generation tasks, and become operational by unification. To facilitate learning, these triples are organized in hierarchies by generality. In a hierarchical scheme, the bottom nodes are very specific and idiomatic while the ones at the top are more general. Phrases may reside at, and inherit from, more than one hierarchy. For example, the phrase to take on can inherit from the hierarchy of take as well as from the hierarchy of on (a hierarchy which defines properties of verb modifiers). Four operations, implemented as forms of unification, and are defined by this representation. They are: (a) interaction between two unrelated phrases, (b) inheritance between two related phrases (one more general than the other), (c) generalization, and (d) discrimination of a phrase, which both update its level of generality. Three hierarchy schemes are given in the following sections to demonstrate three aspects of the system: (a) phrase interaction through the infinitive construction, (b) wordsense representation, and (c) case-order.
REPRESENTING THE INFINITIVE
Consider the following pair of clauses in the sentences below:
Judge Wilson threw the book at him. Judge Wilson decided to throw the book at him.
Parsing the first sentence is carried out simply as a lexicon lookup: a phrase is found in the lexicon, and its concept is instantiated. Parsing the second sentence is more complex since no single lexical phrase is matched for throw. For one thing, the subject does not precede the verb throw as anticipated by the lexical pattern. Identifying the implicit subject involves knowledge of phrase interaction. Properties of phrase interaction (through the infinitive form [Kiparsky71]) are represented by a hierarchy below.
P I equi-rule
,.,// see I plan hear feel tell P3 ask command
Figure 8: The Hierarchy for Phrase Interaction
The names of the individual nodes are mnemonic, and are used for reference only. Each such node is a full pattern-concept-presupposition triple (the presupposition may not appear). The nodes in Figure 8 In this phrase, notice in particular the complement (comp), which defines the embedded phrase. The implicit subject of the embedded phrase is taken as either (1) the object of the embedding phrase, if that object exists, or (2) the subject of the embedding phrase, if the object does not exist. The hierarchy of Figure 8 is used by four processing tasks.
PHRASE INTERACTION
The analysis of the sentence below:
Judge Wilson decided to throw the book at him.
involves the interaction of two specific phrases, as shown schematically in Figure 9 . The two specific lexical phrases involved are the entries for decide (the embedding phrase, P1, elaborated in item (c) at the beginning of Section 6 above) and for throw the book (the embedded phrase, P2, described in Figure 6 above).
The unification of these two phrases guarantees that: (a) the subject of P1 is the subject of P2, and (b) the concept of the P2 (denoted by ?z) is plugged in the plan slot of P1. The interaction of these two phrases yields the compound concept:
select-plan actor wilson.1 plan (auth-punish actor wilsonl to eapone.2)
This concept conveys the meaning of the entire sentence.
PARSING AN UNKNOWN
In contrast to the previous example, consider the analysis of a sentence in which an unknown word is Mary goggled John to come over.
In analyzing this sentence, no lexical phrase is found to account for the word goggle. Therefore, the meaning of the entire sentence cannot be produced. Yet, even a partial meaning cannot be produced for the known clause, to come over, since it is intertwined with the unknown clause Mary goggled John. In order to overcome this obstacle, the interaction involves a more general phrase as shown in Figure 10 . In contrast to Figure 9 , here no specific phrase could be found for goggze, and it is necessary to select the generalized Thus, even when the particular phrase does not exist, the parser is able to construct an initial hypothesis, based on a generalization. In fact, the selection of the generalized phrase is not unambiguous. The nature of the selected phrase is restricted by two schemes: (a) the hierarchy in Figure 8 above, and (b) the persuade plan box [Schank77] Indeed option (38) is not available in English, however, since the phrase is yet unknown to the learner, this option must be given consideration.
6.30VERGENERALIZATION AND RECOVERY
In the case that the word promise does not exist in the lexicon, the program behaves as follows:
User:
John promised Mary to come over. RINA: John told Mary that she must/can come to him.
In using the generalized phrase, RINA unified inappropriately the roles. This is an error of overgeneralization which is typical of children learning new vocabulary items.
ERROR RECOVERY
The user can correct the program by giving an explicit example.
User:
No. John promised Mary to come to her place. Notice two interesting points regarding the semantics of promise: (a) ?x (the embedding subject) is always the subject of the embedded phrase, and (b) the act ?z is presupposed to be a goal of ?y. ?x is the subject of the embedded act, and the act ?z is presupposed to be a goal of ?y.
HANDLING WORD SENSES
By its nature, the phrasal approach is oriented towards the representation of entire groups of words. However, single words, such as up, at, and away must also be represented. Three issues are involved in representing such words. The first sense implies success in deceiving the authorities (as in get away with), while the second sense implies a waste of time (as in idle away). If there is more than one sense for away, then how is the appropriate meaning selected in each instance? In our lexicon, there are two phrases for argue away, which are disambiguated by matching their presuppositions with the context. The two phrases are:
*Another phrase, John looked up to Mary, in contrast to John looked up at Mary, is not processed as a simple production of the particles, since it involves the entire phrase "X look up to Y". 
Figure lh Two Different Senses for argue away
The appropriate phrase is selected in each context by matching the presupposition.
DETERMINING LEVEL OF GENERALITY
Which is the appropriate alternative for representing the phrase in sentence (49) productions, such as run away, argue away (P4), idle away, etc. Such phrases are given in Figure 11 for two cases of argue away.
(e) Nodes at the bottom level describe episodes in which instances of phrases were encountered (e.g., the instances A1 Capone argued it away in court (P5), John Smith argued it away with his wife are indexed to the phrase <?x argue ?y away>).
On the face of it, it seems that levels (a) and ( (50) John tried to describe it away in court.
Sentence (50) introduces a new production to the reader of this paper. Yet, the reader should be able to resolve the new production by using the generalized linguistic pattern P3a in Figure 12 .
LEARNING FROM EXAMPLES
In the previous example we have assumed an existing generalized phrase P3a, which was used in predicting a specific phrase. When such a generality does not exist, learning must be done by induction from specific examples. The following set of examples provide episodes from which RINA can hypothesize the meaning of the phrase to take on.
altogether? This information is contained in a caseorder hierarchy (Figure 14 below) Figure 13 shows two learning processes: describe it away is deduced top-down from an existing general concept (P3a). On the other hand, take on is induced bottom-up from the set of specific episodes such as David and Goliath, the Celtics vs. the Lakers, and the midterm. There is no generalized concept which could serve as a short cut.
In matching sentences (54) and (55) User: The mobster eluded prosecution for years. Last month, they threw the book at him for income-tax evasion. RINA: The prosecutor propelled a book at him? User: No. A judge threw the book at him. RINA: The judge threw the book at him. He found him guilty.
And later on:
User: The dean of the school threw the book at John. RINA: He punished him.
There are three stages in the acquisition process:
(1) Apply the literal interpretation. knowledge, and the fact that a discrepancy has been detected.
LEARNING BY FEATURE EXTRACTION
In constructing the new hypothesis, the program must extract the relevant features from the given episode.
(a) The initial phrase presupposition is taken to be the entire trial script. (b) The pattern is extracted from the sample sentence. (c) The concept is extracted from the script.
In extracting either the pattern or the concept, the problem is to distinguish between features which are relevant and should be taken in as part of the phrase, and features which are irrelevant and thus should be left out. Moreover, some features should be taken as is, where other features must be abstracted before they can be incorporated.
FORMING THE PATTERN
Four rules are used in extracting the linguistic pattern from the sentence:
Last month, they threw the book at him for income-tax evasion.
(1) Initially, use an existing literal pattern. In this case, the initial pattern is: 
Examine other cases in the sample sentence, and include cases in the pattern which could not be interpreted by general interpretation. There are two such cases:
Last month could be interpreted as a general time adverb (i.e.: last year he was still enrolled at UCLA, the vacation started last week, etc.).
For income-tax evasion can be interpreted as a element-paid-for adverb (i.e.: he paid dearly for his crime, he was sentenced for a murder he did not commit, etc.).
This phrase describes propelling an object in order to hit another person. Notice that no presupposition is specified. General phrases such as take, give, catch, and throw do not have a expressed presupposition since they can be applied in many situations.* The literal interpretation fails by plan/goal analysis. In the context laid down by the first phrase (prosecution has active-goal to punish the criminal), "propelling a book" does not serve the prosecution's goals. In spite of the discrepancy, RINA spells out that interpretation above with a question mark, The prosecutor propelled a book at him.'? to notify the user about her current state of (3) Thus, both these cases are excluded.
Variablize references which can be instantiated in the context. In this case ?x is the Judge and ?y is the Defendant. They are maintained as variables, as opposed to case (4):
(4) Freeze references which cannot be instantiated in * Notice the distinction between preconditions and presupposition. While a precondition for "throwing a ball" is "first holding it", this is not part of the phrase presupposition. Conditions which are implied by common sense or world knowledge do not belong in the lexicon.
the context: Since no referent is found for the reference the book, that reference is taken as a frozen part of the pattern instead of the case ?z:phys-obj.
The resulting pattern is:
?x:person throw: <the book> <at ?y:person>
FORMING THE CONCEPT
In selecting the concept of the phrase, there are four possibilities, namely the events shown in Figure 3 (Section 4). The choice of the appropriate one among these four events is facilitated by linguistic clues. As opposed to the phrase they threw the book to him which implies cooperation between the characters, the phrase they threw the book at him implies a goal conflict between the characters. At implies not taking acknowledgement protocols into consideration. E.g., x throws the rock to y implies that x catches y's attention, and gets acknowledgement for y's receipt of the rock. On the other hand, x throws the rock at y implies that y may not be aware or ready to receive the rock. This analysis applies also to talk at vs. talk to, etc. Notice that rather than having a specific root, the pattern of this phrase leaves out the root of the verb as a variable. From lack of acknowledgement, a goal conflict may be inferred. Although RINA has acquired the phrase in a specific context, she might hear the phrase in a different context. She should be able to transfer the phrase across specific contexts by generalization. RINA generalizes phrase meanings by analogical mapping. Thus, when hearing the sentence below, an analogy is found between the two contexts.
The third time he caught John cheating in an exam, the professor threw the book at him.
The trial-script is indexed to a general authority relationship. The actions in a trial are explained by the existence of that relationship. For example, by saying something to the Judge, the Defendant does not dictate the outcome of the situation. He merely informs the Judge with some facts in order to influence the verdict. On the other hand, by his decision, the Judge does determine the outcome of the situation since he presents an authority. Three similarities are found between the $trial and the scene involving John and the professor. Therefore, the phrase presupposition is generalized from the specific trial-script into the general authoritydecree situation which encompasses both examples.
CURRENT STATUS AND LIMITATIONS
The lexical theory (DHPL) described in this paper underlies the program RINA described in the first author's dissertation [Zernik87c] . The program RINA is currently implemented in T [Rees84] (a dialect of SCHEME), on an APOLLO workstation using GATE's [Mueller87] unification language. RINA's lexicon includes more than 200 phrases including grammatic forms, word senses, and idioms. A "micro" version of the program, which carries out basic parsing and learning functions is included as an appendix of the dissertation [Zernik87c] . RINA can engage in learning sessions by using a variety of learning strategies. However, RINA's performance is limited in four ways.
( 
CONCEPT GENERALIZATION
Proliferation of knowledge is the process we try to approximate. The ubiquitous dilemma in comparing two concepts is whether a generalization exists for both, or whether they are distinct concepts. For example, consider the following sequence of examples in teaching the phrase to take on. The second phrase can share the concept acquired for the first one, namely ?x decided to fight ?y. The third phrase; however, requires one to generalize the initial notion since it now appears as ?x accepted a challenge presented by ?y. However, can a generalization be found to encompass the fourth phrase? Notice that although a very general concept which encompasses all of the given examples could be found (?x has something to do with ?y), however, the effectiveness of such a generalized notion is totally diminished. Therefore, a shared concept should be sought at the appropriate level of generality.
DEVIATIONAL USES OF LANGUAGE
So far, the notion of lexical presupposition has not been developed according to its agreed functional definition.
It is agreed that lexical presupposition presents felicity conditions for phrase application. When these conditions are violated, phrases sound awkward, ironic, or simply incorrect. Consider the sentences below:
(62) We refused to let our baby stay up all night, so he threw the book at us. He yelled and screamed for hours. (63) My pals asked me how I got straight A's. I managed to explain it away by telling them it was a bureaucratic mistake.
In each one of these sentences, a lexical presupposition is being violated. Our baby, as we all know, is not really an authority, as required of the actor of the phrase throw the book. Therefore, Sentence (62) sounds ironic. A presuppositional condition is violated also in sentence (63). The entire presupposition states: (a) a planning failure by the actor, (b) a threatening act by a social authority, and (c) an explanation act taken to block that punishment. Now, getting A's is not a planning failure, rather it is a fortuitous success, which makes the situation humorous. Consider the next pair of sentences:
(64) I made an appointment with my advisor. I met him on time. (65) I made an appointment with my advisor. I ran into him on time.
Both run into and meet make the same statement: two characters got into a physical proximity. However, since run into presupposes an unplanned, surprising element which does not exist in the situation, sentence (65) sounds incorrect. In contrast to previous research in which presupposition was used for deriving secondary inferences which are mostly redundant, we suggest using presuppositions for disambiguation, detection of irony [Dyer86a], and even for generation of irony by a computer (by applying phrases in situations where a presuppositional condition has been slightly mutated).
CONCLUSIONS
We have shown how the Dynamic Hierarchical Phrasal Lexicon (DHPL) supports language analysis, and language acquisition. We accounted for a dynamic language behavior by promoting four aspects of lexical representation: Phrases: The lexicon contains entire phrases, accounting uniformly for an entire range including productive as well as non-productive phrase. Hierarchy: The lexicon organizes in a hierarchy, phrases ranging from specific "lexical entries" at the bottom, to general "grammar rules" at the top. Lexical Presupposition: Contextual conditions are incorporated into the lexicon through lexical presuppositions. Presuppositions account for disambiguation in parsing, and for phrase selection in generation.
Integration of Syntax and Semantics: Phrases specify a relation (in the logical sense) between syntax and semantics. Thus, the question whether any lexical feature is syntax or whether it is semantics, becomes insignificant. For example, consider thematic roles for a phrase such as promise (Section 6.4). Are they syntactic or are they semantic? They can be viewed as either. Using this representation we have shown three results in language processing: Coping with Lexical Gaps: The hierarchical structure of the lexicon enables parsing of text even when certain lexical elements are unknown. A partial meaning for the text, which serves as an initial hypothesis, is formed by applying general knowledge when specific knowledge is missing. Using Lexical Clues: In learning meanings of phrases we have used "linguistic clues". For instance, the word at in the judge threw the book at AI, supports the learning process of that idiom. What is the justification for drawing inferences from apparently vague senses of words? In making the lexicon amenable as a linguistic database, from which inference rules can be drawn, we have systematically organized words in a hierarchy, representing words such as at, to, around and away. Thus, the use of linguistic clues per se is not inappropriate; however, all linguistic clues used in a reasoning system, must be drawn from a well-organized lexicon. Knowledge Propagation through Generalization and Specialization: Hierarchy is a precondition for learning by generalization. Through the hierarchical scheme, there are two ways of propagating knowledge: First, bottomup-from instantiated episodes up towards specific phrases, and even higher to generalized word senses. Second, top-down-generalized word senses are propagated down for prediction of new specific phrases. In both cases, effective learning depends on the existence of a well refined hierarchy. Any linguistic system must accommodate not only for spanning a static language, but also for augmenting the original linguistic system itself. In DHPL we have shown how, for a variety of linguistic features, the lexicon itself can be augmented through linguistic experiences. Thus we have accomplished a dynamic linguistic behavior.
